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Respecting the deal: how to manage co-opetitive 
actors in open innovation
Abstract.  Platforms like E-bay allow product seekers and providers to meet and 
exchange goods. On the same way in open innovation, as defined by Chesbrough 
[1], an enterprise can collect ideas from outside the company. But on E-bay, the 
seeker can return the product if it does not correspond to the expectations, since E-
bay  is  the  third-party  actor  in  charge  of  assuring  that  the  agreement  between 
seekers and providers will be respected. So who does provide the same service for 
what concerns open innovation, where specifications might not fully defined? In 
this paper we shall describe the business model of an organizational structure to 
support the elicitation and respect of agreements between actors, who have con-
flicting interests but that gain from cooperating together. The concepts of the mod-
el will be illustrated to derive a set of propositions and a simple example will illus-
trate one of its possible instantiations. The description of our first evaluation phase 
shall find place at the end.
1 Introduction: problem identification
In this paper we deal with co-opetition in open innovation. According to Branden-
burger and Nalebuff [2] a  co-opetition game can be defined by means of five 
components, i.e. Players, Added Values, Rules, Tactics and Scope.
On what concern the players, one can refer to the adaptation of Michael Porter’s 
five forces made by Nalebuff and Branderburger (op.cit., p.30) to quote the four 
key roles that relate to the main actor: customers, suppliers, complementors and 
competitors. The authors list a set of strategies to motivate new players to enter 
the game, and West and Gallegher [3] refers to expectancy theory to suggest the 
reasons that push enterprise to contribute in open source software developments.
The assessment of the added values of actors raises two issues: how to calcu-
late such value and how to increase it. In this sense Simard and West [4] name a 
set of metrics, while West and Gallegher (op.cit.) list three major challenges of 
open innovation, i.e. maximizing returns to internal innovation, incorporating ex-
ternal innovations and motivating spillovers.
The rules in this kind of game deals with the risk of not addressing properly the 
challenges previously mentioned. One can mention West and Gallegher (op.cit.) to 
underline the risk of wrong coordination between actors, which Doz and Hamel 
[5] address by suggesting the design of an interface between actors. We also recall 
the work of Simard and West (op.cit.) and their definitions of different ties (formal 
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VS informal and deep VS wide). In particular, the deep and wide ties address the 
risk of exploitation of the future outcomes of the innovation.
The inventors of the term “co-opetition” list three different tactics to deal with 
information asymmetry between actors.  Referring to  open innovation Doz and 
Hamel (op. cit.) assess the shift in the kind of relationship between actors, while 
West  and  Gallagher  (op.cit.)  describes  four  business  models  used  by  software 
companies to capitalize their contributions to open sources programs.
On the matter of  scope, following the indications of Vanhaverbeke [6]) open 
innovation can be studied at the intra-organizational and firm level, as well as at 
the dyad and inter-organizational level. In our work we shall consider a network 
of actors which deals with each other. Indeed we consider the legal boundaries as 
hard to be defined, since different business units in the same enterprise could be 
submitted to different regulations and deal with each other by means of internal 
service level agreements.
Referring to what has been said so far, from an agency theory point of view co-
opetition is the best strategy for those game in which asymmetry of information 
does not allow complete trust between actors, but yet there is a partial common 
good that can be achieved only by cooperating. 
Our contention is that co-opetition works for projects where there is a high 
risk of failure, which a single actor is not ready to stand, and there is a promise of 
high potential returns, high enough for the actor to be contented even if it receives 
only a part of it. Indeed mentioned by Wagner and Layton [7], there are two kinds 
of risk: the unrewarded one, which is a sort of cost to be paid in advance to enter 
the game, and a rewarded one, which is the promise of potential returns. We be-
lieve that co-opetition aims at sharing the unrewarded risk. This would aim to re-
duce what Khan and Blair [8] defines as the total cost of failure. On the other hand 
this form of partnership requires coordination, which the transaction cost theory 
links to transaction costs.
In this study we will propose a framework that supports management decisions 
concerning the information system - intended as “the interaction between the in-
formation technology and the social setting”([9]) - to achieve the  best  trade-off 
between trust and control, in order to achieve what Cox et al. [10] refers as con-
fidence at a minimum cost. 
A large amount of literature has been previously focused on information tech-
nologies to automatically perform negotiation between enterprises; hence we will 
rather focus on the risk management process in the context of regulatory compli-
ance, i.e. the definition of the objectives of the partnership, the assessment of the 
risks of failure and enforcement of a set of controls.
We believe that  a  viable tactic  for  an actor  should be to  define rules  that 
would shape the game in an advantageous way, and we will follow Hegel's [11] 
suggestion and we will focus on ways to shape the shared platform to exchanges 
information between actors.
Respecting the deal: how to manage co-opetitive actors in open innovation 3
In doing so we will seek to  find an equilibrium between the different re-
quirements of all stakeholders, in order to achieve a solution that is sustainable 
over the time, i.e. which pushes all actors to not quit the game. 
Following what has been said so far, our research question is the following: 
How to support risk management in multi-actor contexts of information 
system regulatory compliance, such as co-opetition in open innovation, in 
order to achieve efficiency, consistency and sustainability?
The rest of the paper proceeds as it follows. Section 2 lists and motivates the 
requirements we set for the solution we wanted to obtain. Section 3 illustrates our
design and it describes the development process of the design. Section 4 presents
the design in action by mean of an example. Section 5 is dedicated to the evalu-
ations of the design that we have already done, together with those tests that will
follows. Section 6 ends the papers with discussions and conclusions.
2 The objectives of the solution
We shall  assume that  the  unrewarded  risk between co-opetitive  actors  will  be 
shared by means of a formal agreement concerning the service that each actor 
shall deliver. In this sense one can identify the set of risks that occurs while sign-
ing a contract. Referring to the three categories of risk in signing a contract de-
scribed by Willcocks et al. [12]), we assess that a consistent number of works 
have been published on the first two sets of risk, namely the contextual risks and 
the ones related to the design of the contract. 
According to what said so far our solution shall address the post-contract is-
sues. Hence the information system to be in place shall include the required capab-
ilities and skills to manage the relationship between co-opetitive actors; it shall in-
clude activities required to perform the required business and technical changes; it 
shall rely on proved standards based on best practices; it shall have a system to 
manage power between co-opetitive actors; and it shall support the monitoring of 
the  supplier  performance  without  forgetting  the  informal  ties  previously  men-
tioned.
Referring to our research question, to obtain efficiency the solution in place 
should include an information system that  reduces manual work and combines 
functionalities to allow data monitoring to assure respect of the SLA and informa-
tion to support the rules management. A list of capabilities of the user of the in-
formation system should be given. To achieve consistency such rules management 
should be represented at a strategic level, in a standard way. On what concerns the 
sustainability of the solution, the information system should be able to evolve in 
time, while the compliance function itself should have a function that allows it to 
adapt to environment change in a profitable way.
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3 Design and development
We decided to start with the most general case and to consider the compliance 
function as a business unit, which could be positioned within or without the refer-
ence  companies,  and we defined  its  business  model  accordingly,  adopting the 
guidelines presented in Osterwalder and Pigneur [13]. 
Proposition 1: the proposed model allows it to obtain a consistent solution, since 
it manages at the strategic level the rules to enforce.
Fig.  1: Business model for the holistic compliance management function
We  designed  our  solution  as  having  a  double-sided  business  model  [14],  i.e. 
basing  its  value  proposition  on  the  alignment  of  different  customer  segments, 
which gain from the network effect of converging in the same platform. In this 
sense we listed the four customer segments according to two dimensions: those 
that seek for a service against those that provide it, and those that belong to the 
same company as the business function against those who do not.
Four value propositions have been deduced from a work on compliance presen-
ted last year at ItAIS [15]: on what concerns the solution seeker, support should be 
delivered regarding  the  requirements  elicitation and the monitoring  of  require-
ments enforcement. On the other hand, the solution providers shall be supported in 
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accessing to cash opportunity and deciding which applications use to enforce the 
regulatory requirements. The relationships between the seekers and providers fol-
low the idea of ties illustrated in Simard and West (op.cit.).
Regarding the distribution channel one could see this business unit as a center 
of excellence, which can take the three shapes presented by Cullen [16]: a best-
practices sharing group, a virtual team or a centralized service. According to the 
shape, the distribution channels offered by the platform will increase their com-
plexity.
From what said so far, the revenue flows appear composed by four components 
related to the four customer segments. One can assume that some components 
might imply a fee to be accessed, while other components might be free to access, 
to attract users in the platform and gain from network effects. 
On what concerns the key activities, beyond those related to the platform manage-
ment, we took inspiration from the existing work of Cox and De Jong [17] and 
Joha [18] in outsourcing regarding the so-called “retained organization”, i.e. the 
portion of the company that is kept to assure the interface with the new suppliers. 
According to the authors five activities should be in place: 
1. The contract management: it  involves a support on everything con-
cerning  the  design  and  management  of  new  formal  agreements 
between the solution seeker and the providers. 
2. The service management: refers to technical problems experienced by 
the solution seekers, which have to be solved by inter-mediator, who 
contacts the provider.
3. The technological advancement: this refers to the support to the pro-
jects management that the provider has in place to deliver the solution.
4. The business advancement: it deals with support on business process 
analysis and design, and process management.
5. Architecture development: this usually implies consulting activities re-
garding the development of the architecture of the solution seeker, by 
producing the requirements for the solution provider.
Proposition 2: the mentioned activities of the business unit allow it to reduce the 
post-contractual  risk,  since  they  support  the  required  business  and  technical 
changes, and they monitor the solution provider.
Proposition 3: the use of standard approach like IPW for the activities of the busi-
ness unit allows it to reduce the post-contractual risk.
The key resources include the service level agreement, the platform (for an ex-
ample of its functionalities one can refer to the recent work of Bonazzi and Pig-
neur [19]), and the capabilities of the employees of the business unit. In this sense 
a large list of capabilities can be found in Cox and De Jong (op.cit.) and Joha (op.-
cit.), which class them in three groups: technical, business and behavioral.
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Proposition 4: the mentioned capabilities of the business unit allow it to reduce 
the post-contractual risk, since it manages the relationship between co-opetitive 
actors.
Proposition 5: the proposed platform allows it to reduce the post-contractual risk, 
since it manages the power relationship between co-opetitive actors.
Proposition 6: the proposed platform allows it to reduce the cost, since it per-
forms most of the tasks automatically.
The partners of the center of excellence are also its customers and the cost struc-
ture reflects that: the major costs involve the platform development and manage-
ment and the acquisition of new solution seekers and providers, to gain from net-
work effects.
Proposition 7: the proposed approach allows it to obtain a sustainable solution, 
since its cash flows are greater than the cost.
4 Instantiation of the artifact
We applied our design to an existing case of open innovation, i.e. Innocentive. In 
this case the  co-opetitive actors  are the problem solution seekers,  who need a 
punctual solution, and the problem solvers, who have the required skills to deliver 
the solution. The solvers get profit from their knowledge, so they will try to solve 
the problem while explaining the solving process as less as possible, while the 
seekers will try to minimize their dependency from an external source. 
Both actors are external to the business unit. In this sense we shall have only 
two customer segments, two value proposition and two revenue flows (the reader 
shall note the access to problems is free to gain new platform users). The distribu-
tion  channel  is  Internet  and  Incentive  can  be  defined  as  a  centralized  service 
offered to the users.
Regarding the key activities, one can find the platform management, while the 
activity 1 and 2 of our list can be deduced by the list of services offered. The key 
resources are the platform, the set of contracts between seekers and solvers, and 
the three groups of capabilities, which can be deduced by the requirements for job 
applicants. The cost structure is not given. Yet one can suppose that in this case, 
with the data available, propositions 2, 4 and 7 would find a confirmation. 
5 Evaluation
In this first stage we have decided to evaluate our model by means of experts' 
opinion. We have already presented our design to a small panel of experts to col-
lect their opinions concerning its efficiency, consistency and sustainability.
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Starting from the feedback received a second version of the model has been de-
veloped and a survey has been prepared to let the experts rate each proposition of 
ours in a five-point Likert scale. The new data collection will be done on a larger 
scale (some 50 experts) in the following months.
6 Discussion and conclusions
The  presented  work  addressed  a  part  of  the  literature  regarding  the  link 
between open innovation, co-opetition and risk management, which has been only 
partially covered so far by the literature. By looking for a suitable solution design 
we crossed different domains, i.e. open innovation, outsourcing and more in gen-
eral enterprise networks governance. Our goal was to start defining the IT mana-
gerial, methodological and technological capabilities and processes aiming at an-
swering our research question. In doing so we hope to rise the interest of Informa-
tion System researchers in this direction of investigation, since we believe that 
such issues fall into the nomological net defined by Benbasat and Zmud [20].
The business model we obtain is still a work in progress, but in its final form it 
will aim at being a pattern for those companies, which find themselves having to 
address the problem of co-opetition in open innovation. 
In this stage of development we have decided to rely on experts’ opinion to 
evaluate our design, since it is the evaluation approach that assured us the largest 
amount of data in a shorter amount of time. In the next iteration we shall apply the 
model to real cases by mean of a qualitative study.
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